

MANUEL SÁNCHEZ RODRÍGUEZ
MIGUEL ESCRIBANO CABEZA

LEIBNIZ EN DIÁLOGO

Título: *Leibniz en diálogo*
Primera edición: Agosto 2017.

© Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez y Miguel Escribano Cabeza (eds.)
© Editorial Thémata 2017.

EDITORIAL THÉMATA
C/ Antonio Susillo, 6. Valencina de la Concepción
41907 Sevilla, ESPAÑA
Tlf: (34) 955 720 289
E-mail: editorial@themata.net
Web: www.themata.net
Imagen de cubierta: Firmamento
Diseño de cubierta: Thémata AJ
Maquetación: Los Papeles del Sitio
Corrección: Thémata AJ

ISBN: 978-84-947082-2-0

DI: SE 1353-2017

Imprime: ULZAMA
Impreso en España • Printed in Spain

Reservados todos los derechos exclusivos de edición para Editorial Thémata. El contenido de esta obra está protegido por la Ley, que establece penas de prisión y/o multas, además de las correspondientes indemnizaciones por daños y perjuicios a cualquier forma de reproducción, distribución, comunicación pública y transformación, total o parcial, de esta obra sin contar con la autorización escrita de los titulares del Copyright.



THÉMATA
SEVILLA • 2017

Bien sûr, au-delà de la controverse sur l'hypothèse de l'harmonie préétablie aussi que sur la constitution du simple, Wolff semble intéressé par la vision globale de l'harmonie des choses qui trouve son expression dans l'harmonie des vérités, qui doivent être liées l'une l'autre avec une rigueur démonstrative.

Mais dans le même temps nous ne pouvons pas négliger le différent milieu à partir duquel le discours de Wolff a son commencement; ce qui a été dit à propos de l'"Empfindung" en est le témoignage. Dans la pensée de Wolff prévaut bien sûr l'intention méthodologique, mais il s'agit d'une méthodologie qui commence de l'expérience ainsi que des principes *a priori*: deux aspects qui doivent être reliés entre eux dès le début.

Dans la traduction latine de la *Monadologie* nous ne trouvons pas le mot "notio", mais plutôt "idea", ainsi que dans la traduction allemande de Köhler nous trouvons deux fois le mot "Inbegriff" et le verbe "begreifen", mais pas le substantif "Begriff". Deux mots, "Begriff" et "notio", qui se correspondent (comme l'indique le petit dictionnaire à la fin de la *Métaphysique allemande*) et qui représentent une grande partie de la différence entre Leibniz et Wolff.

Cela dit, nous ne pouvons pas oublier le rôle décisif joué par ces deux traductions, allemande et latine, dans la destinée de la *Monadologie* de Leibniz. L'empreinte de Wolff reste décisive dans le choix des termes allemands et latins, dans le passage significatif du latin de la Scholastique aux nouvelles langues de la modernité.

J. COLIN MCQUILLAN

CLARITY AND DISCTINCTNESS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY GERMANY: METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, AESTHETICS

1. Introduction

Leibniz's influence on philosophy in Germany during the eighteenth century is extensive, but the new definitions of clarity and distinctness he proposes in the *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas* deserve special attention, because they played a role in so many different parts of German philosophy. In what follows, I will track the role these definitions played from Leibniz's metaphysics to Wolff's logic and metaphysics, Baumgarten's aesthetics, and Kant's critical philosophy. Although the reign of clear and distinct ideas in German philosophy came to an end when Kant and his followers began to argue that clarity and distinctness could not explain the distinction between sensibility and the understanding; the relationship between concepts and objects; or the validity of judgments about truth and beauty, I will argue that they preserved the systematic connection between metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics that had been established by Wolff and Baumgarten using the concepts of clarity and distinctness.

2. Leibniz's Metaphysics

Responding to the debate between Antoine Arnauld and Nicolas Malebranche about true and false ideas, Leibniz proposed new definitions of clarity and distinctness in his *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas*¹. According to Leibniz, a notion is obscure when it is not sufficient to recognize the

¹ G.W. Leibniz, *Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas*, included in *G.W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays*, Translated and Edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1989: 23-27.

object it represents. It is clear when the notion is sufficient for recognizing the object it represents. Clear knowledge can be either confused or distinct. It is confused when one cannot enumerate the marks that distinguish the notion from other notions, but it is distinct when those marks are also clear. When all of the marks that distinguish a notion from other notions are clear, then the notion is adequate. Adequate notions are rare for human beings, because many things are so complex that it is virtually impossible for a finite mind to consider all of its marks at the same time. In cases where we do not have an adequate notion of a thing, Leibniz thinks we can clarify our ideas through analysis, which distinguishes the marks that constitute a thing.

Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics* shows that the account of the clarity and distinctness he proposes in the *Meditations* extends well beyond Cartesian epistemology². When he says that everything that happens to a substance is included in its notion, along with the whole series of external things surrounding that substance in (§9) of the *Discourse*, Leibniz is identifying the marks that distinguish one notion from another with the predicates that distinguish one substance from another³. The notion of a substance is its definition. Unfortunately, since each substance "expresses, however confusedly, everything that happens in the universe, whether past, present, or future," the adequate notion or real definition of any substance would require what Leibniz calls "infinite perception or knowledge"⁴. The perception and knowledge of human minds is limited, so Leibniz concludes that "the greater part of human knowledge is only confused or *suppositive*"⁵.

That Leibniz continued to defend this view in his later work is evident from the *New Essays*. Referring back to his *Meditations*, Leibniz repeats his distinctions between obscure, clear, confused, distinct, and adequate notions. He denies that we can know things distinctly through the senses, because the senses do not allow us to "distinguish their contents" and identify "the distinct properties which the idea must be found to contain when one has brought order into its confusion"⁶. Leibniz is more optimistic about the ability

2 Leibniz objects to Descartes use of clear and distinct ideas as a *criterium veritatis* in *Meditations*, 26. See also G.W. Leibniz, *Critical Thoughts on the General Part of the Principles of Descartes*, included in *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters* (2nd ed.), Edited and Translated by Leroy E. Loemker, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1989: 389.

3 G.W. Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, included in G.W. Leibniz: *Philosophical Essays*, Translated and Edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1989: 41-42.

4 *Discourse on Metaphysics* (*Ibid.*, 42).

5 *Discourse on Metaphysics* (*Ibid.* 56).

6 G.W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, Edited and Translated by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996: 255-258.

of the mind to perceive things distinctly, but he still thinks human beings are be unable to "direct our attention to an infinity of things at the same time," which means that many of our ideas remain confused⁷. The reasons for this confusion are ultimately metaphysical: Every substance mirrors the entire universe, so it contains too many properties to be adequately represented by a finite mind.

3. Wolff's Logic and Metaphysics

Christian Wolff acknowledges the debt he owes to Leibniz's *Meditations* in several places, but he makes rather different use of Leibniz's account of clarity and distinctness than Leibniz did himself⁸. This becomes apparent in Wolff's *German Logic (Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Understanding and their Right Use in the Knowledge of Truth, 1712)* and *German Metaphysics (Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Human Soul, 1719)*.

In the first chapter of his *German Logic*, Wolff repeats Leibniz's distinctions between obscure, clear, confused, and distinct concepts, in order to distinguish the objects of our thoughts⁹. Like Leibniz, Wolff defines an obscure concept as one that does not allow us to distinguish the object it represents, which a clear concept allows us to distinguish the object it represents. A clear concept is distinct when we can identify the marks through which we represent an object, but it is indistinct when those marks remain unclear. Instead of following Leibniz and declaring any concept whose marks are confused to be inadequate, Wolff introduces a distinction between "complete" (*ausführlich, completa*) and "adequate" (*vollständig, adaequata*) concepts¹⁰. He considers this addition to Leibniz's classification to be very significant, since some distinct concepts may be only partly distinct and partly confused¹¹. Partly confused concepts may be inadequate from the metaphysical perspective Leibniz adopts, but Wolff thinks they are perfectly sufficient for the purposes of scientific demonstration. We do not need metaphysically adequate concepts

7 *New Essays* (*Ibid.* 113).

8 See, for example, Chr. Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit (German Logic)*, included in Chr. Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke* (I. Abt., Bd. 1), Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2006: 109 (Vorrede zur ersten Auflage). See also Chr. Wolff, *Ausführliche Nachricht*, included in Chr. Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke* (I. Abt., Bd. 9), Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 1996: §58.

9 *German Logic*, §4, §7.

10 *German Logic*, §15-§16.

11 *Ausführliche Nachricht*, §58.

to produce valid proofs in logic, though we do need relatively complete concepts in order to reason correctly¹².

Leibniz's account of clarity and distinctness also plays an important role in Wolff's metaphysics. Instead of using adequate notions to explain the nature of substance, Wolff uses the difference between indistinct and distinct cognition to distinguish the lower and the higher cognitive faculties. He does this in a relatively informal way in the *German Metaphysics*, where he defines the understanding as "the faculty to represent the possible distinctly" after distinguishing between thoughts that are obscure, clear, and distinct to varying degrees¹³. This definition allows Wolff to distinguish the understanding from the imagination and the senses, whose representations are "at best clear and not distinct" and only become distinct "when the understanding is added"¹⁴. Wolff employs this distinction more systematically in later works like the *Empirical Psychology*, where he uses the distinction the lower cognitive faculty, whose ideas and notions are obscure and confused, and the higher cognitive faculty, whose ideas and notions are distinct, as the organizing principle for his discussion of the cognitive faculties¹⁵. In the process, he transforms distinctness from a characteristic of some of our concepts to the defining feature of the understanding that distinguishes its cognition from the senses and the imagination.

4. Baumgarten's Metaphysics and Aesthetics

In his *Metaphysics*, Alexander Baumgarten adopts Wolff's distinction between the lower and higher cognitive faculties, identifying the lower cognitive faculty as "the faculty of knowing something obscurely and confusedly" and the higher cognitive faculty as "the faculty of knowing something distinctly"¹⁶. Baumgarten also agrees with Leibniz and Wolff that "there is something obscure in every sensation and hence to some extent there is always an admixture of confusion in sensation, even a distinct one"¹⁷. Yet he is

12 *German Logic*, §18.

13 Chr. Wolff, *Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (*German Metaphysics*), included in Chr. Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke* (I. Abt., Bd. 2.1), Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2009: §277

14 *German Metaphysics*, §277.

15 Chr. Wolff, *Psychologica Empirica*, included in Chr. Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke* (II. Abt., Bd. 3), Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2001: §54-§55, §275.

16 A.G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, Edited and Translated by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers, Bloomsbury, London, 2013: §520, §624.

17 *Metaphysics*, §544. It is curious that Baumgarten adds "even a distinct one" (*etiam distincta*) in this passage, because he is generally very consistent in denying the possibility that anything

not willing to dismiss sensible cognition, simply because it is indistinct. Instead, he proposes a new standard for the perfection of cognition that breaks with the precedent set by Leibniz and Wolff. Baumgarten asks us to imagine "two clear thoughts of equally clear marks, where one thought contains three marks and the other contains six"¹⁸. By drawing the obvious conclusion and affirming that the thought with six marks is clearer than the thought with three marks, Baumgarten shows that one does not need to analyze the marks of our concepts in order to achieve greater degrees of clarity. By increasing the number rather than the clarity of marks, the sensible cognition of the lower cognitive faculty can be improved without the addition of the understanding. Clarity without distinctness constitutes a new standard of sensible perfection, which Baumgarten uses as the basis for a new science of aesthetics.

At the end of the *Reflections on Poetry*, Baumgarten introduces this new science through an analogy with logic. Just as logic guides the intellectual cognition of the higher cognitive faculty to perfection, aesthetics will guide the sensible cognition of the lower cognitive faculty to perfection¹⁹. The reason these two sciences cannot be reduced to one another concerns the distinctness of the cognition with which logic and aesthetics are concerned. While the perfect intellectual cognition that logic strives to achieve is distinct, the sensible cognition of aesthetics will always remain confused. Baumgarten uses the concept of extensive clarity to explain the confused perfection of sensible cognition in the *Reflections on Poetry*, but he calls the perfection of sensible cognition "beauty" in the *Aesthetics*²⁰. This represents a considerable advance on his earlier account of the perfection of sensible cognition, because it identifies a perfection that only sensible cognition can possess. The identification of this perfection justifies the systematic investigation of the sensible cognition that Baumgarten undertakes in the *Aesthetics* and shows that confused sensible cognition can be just as perfect as distinct intellectual cognition. The analogy between aesthetics and logic that Baumgarten proposes in the *Reflections on Poetry* reflects the difference between the perfections of beautiful and distinct

sensible could be distinct. He even identifies sensible representation as "a representation that is not distinct" in *Metaphysics*, §521.

18 *Metaphysics*, §531 (translation modified).

19 A.G. Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, Edited and Translated by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1954: §115. On the analogy between aesthetics and logic, see U. Franke, *Kunst als Erkenntnis: Die Rolle der Sinnlichkeit in der Ästhetik des Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten*, *Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa*, Bd. IX, 37-39.

20 *Reflections on Poetry*, §17. See also A.G. Baumgarten, *Ästhetik (Teil I)*, Edited and Translated into German by Dagmar Mirbach, Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 2007: §14.

cognition that he develops in the *Aesthetics*, while eliminating the hierarchy that Leibniz and Wolff had established between them.

5. Kant's Critique

Figures like Georg Friedrich Meier, Moses Mendelssohn, and Johann August Eberhard made great use of the conceptions of clarity and distinctness that had emerged in German philosophy during the eighteenth century²¹. Yet appeals to these concepts in works on metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics started to decline at the end of the eighteenth century, when Immanuel Kant and his followers began their attack on the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, they played almost no role in German philosophy.

Kant's critique of clarity and distinctness can be traced back to his inaugural dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intellectual World*. In the second section, immediately before he defines metaphysics as "the philosophy which contains the *first principles* of the use of the *pure understanding*," Kant criticizes Wolff's account of the difference between sensible and intellectual cognition, precisely because it relies on the distinction between confused and distinct cognition²². Kant argues "the sensible is poorly defined as that which is *more confusedly* cognized, and that which belongs to the understanding as that of which there is a *distinct* cognition," because "sensitive representations can be very distinct and representations which belong to the understanding can be extremely confused"²³. Because sensible and intellectual cognition can be either confused or distinct without ceasing to be sensible or intellectual, Kant concludes that Wolff's distinction between the senses and the understanding is "merely logical" and "does not touch at all the things *given*, which underlie every logical comparison"²⁴. That is why he intro-

21 See, for example, G.F. Meier, *Anfangsgründe aller schönen wissenschaften* (2. Auf. 1. Teil), Hemmerde, Magdeburg, 1754: §1-§6. See also G.F. Meier, *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre*, included in *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften* (Bd. XVI), Edited by Erich Adickes, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1924: §22; M. Mendelssohn, *Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence*, Translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom and Corey Dyck, Springer, Dodrecht, 2011: 101-103; J.A. Eberhard, "Über den wesentlich Unterschied der Erkenntnis durch die Sinne und durch den Verstand", in: Marion Lauschke and Manfred Zahn (eds.), *Immanuel Kant: Der Streit mit Johann August Eberhard*, Meiner, Hamburg, 1998: 60-69.

22 I. Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy Before 1770* (*Inaugural Dissertation: On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*), Edited and Translated by David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992: §8.

23 *Inaugural Dissertation*, §7.

24 *Inaugural Dissertation*, §7.

duces his own distinction between sensibility and the understanding, based on the receptivity of sensibility and the spontaneity of the understanding; the different objects of their cognition; and the different kinds of relationships that obtain between sensible and intellectual cognition and their objects²⁵. Kant's subsequent correspondence shows that he thought this way of distinguishing the sensible and the intellectual was one of the most important contributions of his dissertation²⁶.

Kant continued his attack on the concepts of clarity and distinctness in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, and later works like *On a Discovery*. It is noteworthy that while Kant's views on the faculties of sensibility and the understanding, the objects of our cognition, and the kind of relationship that obtains between our cognition and its objects changed considerably in the period between the publication of his inaugural dissertation and the *Critique of Pure Reason*, his objection to the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy remained largely the same. In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' of the first *Critique*, he complains that "the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has... directed all investigations of the nature and origin of our cognitions to an entirely unjust point of view considering the distinction between sensibility and the intellectual as merely logical, since it is obviously transcendental and does not concern merely the form of distinctness or indistinctness, but its origin and content"²⁷. The only real difference between this objection and the one Kant raised in his inaugural dissertation is his insistence, in the first *Critique*, that the distinction between sensibility and the understanding is transcendental. This means that Kant now regards the distinction between sensibility and the understanding as a universal and necessary condition of all possible experience, which can be demonstrated *a priori*²⁸. Kant did not hold this view in his inaugural dissertation, where he argued that it was necessary to distinguish sensible and intellectual cognition, so that everything sensible could be excluded from metaphysics²⁹. Yet his disdain for "merely logical" distinctions based on confusion and distinctness is evident from works belonging to both the pre-critical and critical periods³⁰.

25 *Inaugural Dissertation*, §3-§4.

26 I. Kant, *Correspondence* (*Kant to Lamber, September 20, 1770 and Kant to Herz, June 7, 1771*), Edited and Translated by Arnulf Zweig, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999: 107-109, 126-128 (X: 96-99, 121-124).

27 I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Edited and Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998 (A44/B61-B62).

28 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A1-A2, A11-A13/B24-B26.

29 *Inaugural Dissertation*, §8.

30 In addition to the objections in Kant's inaugural dissertation and *Critique of Pure Reason*,

Many of Kant's followers shared his disdain for the concepts of clarity and distinctness. A good example is Johann Schultz, who asserts in his *Exposition of the Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* that "Leibniz intellectualized mere appearances and regarded them as representations of things in themselves which were distinguished from the concepts of the understanding merely logically with respect to distinctness because they were made confused by the senses"³¹. Pressing his attack, Schultz claims that "in the case of sensible objects, Leibniz pays no regard to the special conditions of their intuition..."³² Schultz's charges are very similar to the criticisms Kant leveled against the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but not every Kantian agreed that clarity and distinctness were empty and fallacious. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, who may have done more to promote the Kantian philosophy than anyone else in Germany, actually thought clarity and distinctness had an important role to play in the development of the critical philosophy. In the third book of his *Attempt at a New Theory of the Human Faculty of Representation*, Reinhold argues that clarity and distinctness are the two most basic features of consciousness in general, because it is impossible to distinguish the subject and object of our representations when our consciousness unclear or indistinct³³. He even goes so far as to say that distinct consciousness is the key to self-consciousness, since it is only when I have a distinct concept of myself as a subject representing an object in my consciousness that I can claim to be self-conscious³⁴. The German idealists do not seem to have thought very much of this aspect of Reinhold's *Elementarphilosophie*, because similar claims about the clarity and distinctness of consciousness are nowhere to be found in the works of Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel³⁵. The rise and subsequent radicalization of Kantian idealism seems to have eliminated any systematic significance the concepts of clarity and distinctness may have had by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

see I. Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy After 1781 (Prolegomena, 1783; On a Discovery, 1790; What Real Progress, c. 1793)*, Edited and Translated by Henry Allison and Peter Heath, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002: 85, 310, 368 (IV:290, VIII: 219-220, XX:277).

31 J. Schultz, *Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, Translated by James C. Morrison, University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, 1995: 48 (81).

32 *Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 48 (81).

33 K.L. Reinhold, *Versuch Einer Neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vostellungsvermögens*, Widtmann and Mauke, Prague, 1795: Bk. 3, §38-§40.

34 *Versuch Einer Neuen Theorie*, Bk. 3, §40.

35 Fichte makes passing reference to "clear and distinct presentation" of his ideas in *Some Lectures Concerning the Vocation of the Scholar* and in various iterations of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, but I have found no systematically significant reference to clarity and distinctness in any of the works of the Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel.

6. Conclusions

One could argue that the role clarity and distinctness played in eighteenth century German philosophy is of merely historical interest. However, I would argue that the account I have sketched in this paper can also tell us a great deal about the nature of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy; the way that philosophical systems are structured; and the ways those systems change. If this is true, then I think the role that clarity and distinctness played in philosophy in Germany in the eighteenth century is of genuine philosophical interest as well.

First, the account of clarity and distinctness that I have presented in this paper shows that the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy was not a monolithic doctrine. This view of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy is perhaps less common than it used to be, but it is still important to demonstrate that words like "traditional" and "scholastic" do not adequately describe its form or content. It is evident even from the different ways they use the concepts of clarity and distinctness that the relationship between Leibniz and Wolff is not merely the relationship between a master and his disciple³⁶. It also shows that relationship between Wolff and his followers is more than a relationship between summarizers and popularizers³⁷. If these relationships were really so simple, then clarity and distinctness would play the same role in Leibniz's and Wolff's metaphysics and Wolff and Baumgarten would have the same view of the relationship between sensibility and the understanding. The fact that Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten differ on all of these issues shows that the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy not a monolithic doctrine.

The way the concepts of clarity and distinctness are used to structure the relationship between the different parts of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy is also instructive, because it shows how different kinds of philosophical problems can be solved using a few basic concepts. This much is clear from the way that clarity and distinctness are employed in metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics. What is perhaps even more interesting is the way these concepts are used to organize philosophy itself. Wolff makes distinct con-

36 On the differences between Leibniz and Wolff, see C.A. Corr, *Christian Wolff and Leibniz*, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 1975, 36 (2), 241-262.

37 On the relationship between Wolff and his followers, see G. Mühlfordt, "Radikaler Wolffianismus: Zur Differenzierung und Wirkung der Wolffschen Schule ab 1735", and N. Hammerstein, "Christian Wolff und die Universitäten: Zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Wolffianismus im 18. Jahrhundert", both included in: Werner Schneiders (ed.), *Christian Wolff, 1679-1754*, Meiner, Hamburg, 1986: 237-253, 266-277.

cepts a precondition for metaphysics in his logic, but he also situates the faculties of confused and distinct cognition within his metaphysics, in order to define the relationship between the faculties of sensibility and the understanding³⁸. While Wolff suggests that there is a hierarchical relationship between sensibility and the understanding, Baumgarten maintains that the cognition of the lower and higher faculties each have their own perfection, so that the sciences that are concerned with that cognition stand in an analogous rather than hierarchical relation to one another. By situating aesthetics in relation to logic within the framework of metaphysics, Baumgarten does more than introduce a new science. He defines the structure of the philosophy itself.

Finally, the success of the Kantian campaign against clarity and distinctness should not lead us to conclude that philosophy changes when a great philosopher sees the fatal flaw in the works of his predecessors and proposes a new system that gains an enthusiastic following. These narratives are common in the history of philosophy, because they are both convenient and easily comprehensible. However, the truth is almost always more complicated. That is certainly true in this case, because Kant preserves the relationship between metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics that was established in the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, despite his hostility to the concepts of clarity and distinctness and the way Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten used them to distinguish sensible and intellectual cognition. That Kant reaffirms the relationship between metaphysics, logic, and aesthetics that was established in the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition is evident from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which is presented as a work on metaphysics, whose elements include a transcendental aesthetic and a transcendental logic. Kant even defines the elements of his new metaphysics in terms very similar to the ones Baumgarten uses. He says, for example, that the transcendental aesthetic is "the science of all principles of *a priori* sensibility," while transcendental logic "has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason"³⁹. Kant refers to principles of *a priori* sensibility, rather than the perfection of sensible cognition, and he does not say understanding and reason belong to the higher cognitive faculty in this passage; yet the structure of the first *Critique* reproduces the complementary relationship between aesthetics and logic that developed within the context of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philos-

ophy. The fact that Kant rejected the grounds for this relationship while preserving their consequences makes the task of understanding the changes that took place in German philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century that much more complicated than historians of philosophy usually take them to be.

38 On the relationship between logic and metaphysics in Wolff, see J.C. McQuillan, *Wolff's Logic, Kant's Critique, and the Foundations of Metaphysics* (Forthcoming).

39 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A21/B35, A57/B81.